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INTRODUCTION
Issues of economic policy are necessarily issues of politics. Even  in theory
it is difficult to distinguish between the economic and  political  aspects of the
problem.... Even  if the economist tries to distinguish between the economic
and political elements in  his argument, the public is unlikely  to recognize
the distinction. To the public an economist is an economist, and most people
are not usually able, even  if they were willing, to distinguish the political
from  the economic. ...  The  need to distinguish between the economic and
political  element in any prescription  is emphasized in academic economics,
but when economists debate in public they frequently ignore this distinction
(E.  Devons,  1961,  p.34,  p.43).
Recent trade agreements  involving Canada and the United States have led to greater
north-south  trade  flows of agricultural  products  and  increased  competition  in  the North
American  grain  markets.  The  Canada-United  States free  trade agreement (CUSTA)  was
an  important  step  towards  a  more  integrated  North  American  market  for  agricultural
products  and  the  multilateral  Uruguay  agreement  was  a  move  in  the  same  direction.
However,  with  this  expanded  trade  has  come  additional  North  American  agricultural
policy  conflicts  and  many  of these  conflicts  have  been with  respect  to  grains,  mainly
barley  and wheat.  In Canada, the government  and the  grains  industry (farmers,  handlers,
and  processors),  cannot  agree  on  whether  more  or  less  grain  should  be  sold  into  the
United  States.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  United  States,  farmers,  processors,  and  the
government,  have argued  over whether or not more Canadian grain  imports are  preferred
to  less.  Economists  have  also been actively  involved  in these public  policy debates  and
they  cannot  agree  either.  They  have  (unavoidably)  mixed  in  economic  and  political
aspects  of the  problem.
Special interest groups in agriculture  are politically very powerful  in both countries,
influencing all aspects  of grains policy.  Although  some subsidies are difficult  to measureProceedings
with  precision',  it  appears  that  in  general,  grain  farmers  and  agribusiness  are  more
successful  at  lobbying  in  the  United  States,  compared  to  their  counterparts  in  Canada.
Grain  farmers  in  the  United  States  have  stronger  political  support  than  do  Canadian
farmers.  One  possible explanation  is that the  private  sector in the  United States  is more
efficient  at lobbying,  than are the  cooperatives  and state trading agency  in Canada.  This
view is supported  by the observation that the Australian  grain marketing  system has many
similarities to Canada's and farmers  in Australia  do not enjoy strong political support, less
than  in either  the United  States  or Canada.  However,  the  lobbying process  with respect
to  grains  policy  is not  very well understood  and  thus  it  is difficult  to say  which  groups
are more  successful  at  lobbying and  why.
To better understand the grains policy process, it is necessary to understand the role
of special  interest  groups,  the  dynamics  of the  coalitions  they  form,  and  why  they  are
influential.  It is also worth considering why economists  are so unsuccessful  in the policy
process.  Perhaps  academic economists have little incentive to get involved in debates over
grains  policy  and  thus  their  influence  is  minimal  because  they  are  disinterested  in the
politics of grains  policy.  Alternatively,  the rhetorical  gap between economists  and policy
makers  may be  too large,  rendering  economists  ineffective.  Of course, this  is  also true
outside of agriculture as economists involved in non-agricultural policy issues are no more
successful  than agricultural  economists  in terms of influencing policy makers.  Galbraith
provides  an interesting  anecdote  on  the  ineffectiveness  of academic  economists:
Council of  Economic Advisors Chairman Murray Weidenbaum, when asked
directly what weight of influence, on a scale of one to ten, economists had
enjoyed in drafting  the original  tax program of the [Reagan] administration,
replied,  "Zero" (quoted  in  Cordes,  et  al.,  1994,  p.224).
Both  the  Canadian  and  United  States  governments  have endorsed  freer  trade  in
grains with the signing of CUSTA and then, subsequently, the Uruguay Round agreement.
Implicitly,  these  two  agreements  introduce  more  uniform  international  laws  implicitly
designed  to  limit  the  political  power  of domestic  lobby  groups.  The  agreements  can
essentially be viewed as  an international pact not to  "give in" to domestic special interests
(Esty,  1993).  Unfortunately,  both  the  United  States  and  Canadian  governments  have
broken this pact by resorting to unilateral  policy choices  in response  to domestic political
pressure  in  grains.  For  instance,  the  credibility  and  good  faith  of  the  United  States
government's  commitment  to  free  trade  has been  questioned  by recent  unilateral  actions
taken  with respect  to  placing  a  limit  on  imports  of Canadian  wheat,  and  by  threats  to
impose  permanent  import  barriers  against  Canadian  grains.
In the  United  States  the  expanded  north-south  trade  has  been  interpreted  as  the
consequence  of two  "unfair"  trade  practices  which  are  pursued  by  Canada,  namely,
transportation  subsidies  on grain  shipments  and  the so-called  "secretive"  pricing policies
'Canadian  grain  subsidies are  slightly  less than  in the  U.S.,  on  average,  according  to  PSEs
published  by the  OECD.  However,  the PSEs  overstate  the  level  of subsidy to  western  Canadian  grain
farmers  because they do  not account for the negative effects  of excessive regulation  in the  Canadian grain
handling and transport  system.  For  example,  in the  province  of Alberta,  the  combination  of exorbitant
(regulated)  elevation fees and the cost of pooling transportation  across the prairies, has negated any benefit
due  to  rail  freight subsidies under  the  Western  Grain  Transportation  Act.
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of the  CWB.  Ironically,  removal  of the  transportation  subsidies  and  elimination of the
CWB's monopoly over exports, would probably  lead to additional  imports of grain  from
Canada (Carter,  1993a).  The  United States has  claimed that  Canada is an  "unfair" trader
because  it  grants  a  state  trading  organization  (the  Canadian  Wheat  Board-CWB)
exclusive  rights to export wheat and barley.  In  fact, the standard  approach  of the  United
States government  has  been to view  any  state trading agency,  in any  country,  as  having
an  inequitable  trading  advantage  due  to  "secretive"  pricing.  For  instance,  the  United
States  government's  objection  to  China's  entry  into  the  World  Trade  Organization
(WTO)  is  partially  based  on the  fact  that  China  imports  grain  through  a  state  trading
agency (Hafemeister,  1994).  In contrast, economic theory would predict that state trading
agencies  are  inefficient,  and  thus would  be  inferior  traders,  unless  they  had  sufficient
market  power  to  make  up  for  the  inherent  inefficiencies  due  to  lack  of competitive
discipline  within  the  organization.  The  reasons  for  the  United  States  government's
blanket  opposition  to  any  state  trader  in  grains  are  not  immediately  obvious,  as  it  is
doubtful  that  all the  state  traders  in  all  grains  have market power.  In fact,  state trading
agencies  like  the CWB  or the Australian  Wheat Board  (AWB)  sell  a large  percentage  of
their  grain for  export to private trading companies  and thus  do not  deal directly  with the
final importer,  suggesting an  absence of market power.  As part of the  1994  United States
International  Trade  Commission  (USITC)  hearings  on  Canadian  wheat  exports  to  the
United  States,  the CWB  argued  that it  typically  sells wheat  to  the United  States through
accredited agents  (e.g.,  private trading companies)  and therefore  the CWB may not know
the  final  landed price  of a  shipment.  The  same  is true  for CWB  sales  of barley  to the
United  States.  If the  final  landed price  or  final customer  is unknown to  the  state trader,
then market  power  is most  likely  absent.
The  United  States  sense  of  injury  due  to  "unfair"  Canadian  grain  policies  is
heightened  by  the  unwillingness  of Canada  to  reduce  by  any  appreciable  degree  the
protectionist  effects  of  its  supply  management  programs  and,  thereby,  permit  the
expansion of United States exports to that market for dairy and poultry products.  Perhaps
grain disputes  should not be viewed  in isolation from  these other  commodity  disputes  in
dairy,  chickens,  or sugar.
Canada has responded to the United States criticisms by pointing out that the CWB
is  infrequently  subsidized  by  the  government
2,  that  United  States  grain  subsidies  have
historically  been higher  than in Canada,  and that United  States  export subsidies  raise the
domestic  United  States  price above world  levels and  natural  arbitrage pressures  result in
more Canadian  grains flowing into the United States.  The recent debates over wheat have
been  summarized  by  Alston,  Gray  and Sumner  (1994),  while those  in barley  have  been
discussed  by  Veeman  (1993),  and by  Johnson  and  Wilson  (1994).  The  purpose  of this
2 The  CWB pools all  sales within  a crop  year  (August  to July)  and  advances  to farmers  an
initial  payment  when  farmers  deliver  their  grain.  Government  budgetary  transfers  to  the  CWB  are
infrequent,  and  only  occur  when  final  returns  amount  to  less than  the  initial  payment.  In  the  case of
barley, the  "pool  losses" have been  insignificant,  except  in  1985/86 when they were  $35  ($C)  per mt. and
in  1986/87  when  losses  were  $17  per  mt.  In  the  case of wheat,  losses have  been  less  common,  with a
small  loss of $1.05  per mt in  1985/86.  In  1990/91,  wheat  losses were  rather  large, however,  with  a $20
per mt. loss  on the durum  wheat pool  and  a $30  per  mt.  loss  in the wheat  pool.  These large pool  deficits
occurred  at  a time when  significant  changes  occurred  in U.S.  exports as a consequence  of the Farm  Bill.
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paper is to outline some of the  forces and  factors  that have produced  the disputes between
Canada and  the United States,  and  to  discuss the  role  of economists  in the  debate,  with
the  overall  aim of better understanding  the  policy  process.
DESCRIPTION  OF  THE DISPUTES
Durum Wheat
The  recent  grain  disagreements  center  primarily  around  additional  southbound
Canadian exports to the  U.S and it all began with durum wheat (Alston,  Carter,  Gray  and
Sumner,  1994)  after the signing of CUSTA.  The CWB was never precluded from selling
grain  into  the  United  States  market  but  CUSTA  provided  a  more  formal  means  of
legitimizing sales.  With CUSTA,  there was  less threat of imposition of Section  22 of the
Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  of  1933,  which  allowed  the  United  States  government  to
impose  quotas on  imports  if it was determined  that such imports were  threatening United
States  price support programs.  Prior to  CUSTA,  Canadian import  barriers  were high for
grain,  while  those  in  the  United  States  were  relatively  small.  As  a  result  of CUSTA,
Canadian  import  licenses  were  to  be  removed  and  the  United  States  tariff was  to  be
lowered,  and this has  happened  in the  case of wheat.  CUSTA  also  eliminated  Canadian
subsidized freight rates  on  grains  exported  to the United  States through  the west coast  of
Canada.
In  the late  1980s, the  United States began  importing significant  amounts of durum
wheat  from Canada and these  shipments  soon became  a major trade irritant to the  United
States.  The United States  government position was that  increased Canadian  durum  sales
were inconsistent with the 1989  CUSTA and the Canadian government  strongly disagreed.
In  response  to the imports,  in December  1989,  the United  States Congress  instructed  the
United  States  International  Trade  Commission  (USITC)  to  examine  the  "conditions  of
competition"  between  the  United  States  and  Canadian  durum  industries3. The  USITC
report  in  1990  concluded  that the  drought  of 1987-89  was  the main reason for  increased
durum  imports  from  Canada  and price  differences  were  not  found  to  be a factor.
However,  the  issue  was  not  put  to  rest  by  the  USITC  ruling  and  the  case  of
Canadian durum  wheat sales was then heard before  the CUSTA  binational  panel in  1992.
The  United  States  alleged  that  the  growth  in  Canadian  exports  was  due  to  the  CWB
selling  into  the  United  States  at  less  than  acquisition  cost  and  that,  in  addition,  the
Canadian transportation  subsidy  led  directly to  increased  Canadian exports  to the  United
States.  Under  CUSTA,  public  entities  cannot  export  agricultural  goods  to  the  other
country  at  less than the acquisition  price:
Neither party,  including any public entity that it establishes or maintains,
shall sell agricultural  goods for export to the territory  of the other Party at
3 This  was  USITC  Investigation  No.  332-285  "Durum  Wheat:  Conditions  of Competition
Between  the  U.S.  and Canadian  Industries".
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a price below the acquisition  price of the goods plus any storage, handling
or other costs incurred by it with respect to  those goods.  (CUSTA  Article
701.3)
The charge that the CWB was selling into the United  States below acquisition price
was  akin to  the notion that the  CWB was  "dumping"  into the  United States market.  The
binational  panel  did not agree  with the  United  States  claim and  the panel  made  its  final
ruling  in favor  of Canada  in  January  1993.  The  panel  found there  was  no  compelling
evidence  that  the CWB  was selling below its  acquisition  cost.  In arriving at its  decision
on  acquisition  costs,  the  panel  noted that  Ms.  Ann  Veneman,  Deputy  Secretary  of the
USDA,  and United  States Trade  Representative  Clayton  Yeutter,  on  separate  occasions,
had both  defined  the term  "acquisition  cost"  to  be the  CWB's  initial payment
4. In  the
final  report,  the panel  stated  that  the United  States  government  had tried  to  avoid  the
Veneman  and Yeutter statements,  however  the binational panel viewed the  Veneman  and
Yeutter  statements  as being  important.  Unfamiliarity  with the  Canadian  system  could
have  led  to  these  statements  by  Veneman  and  Yeutter  on  CWB  acquisition  costs  and,
ironically,  these official  government statements helped Canada win the case in front of the
binational  panel.
The  accuracy  of the  statements  by Veneman  and Yeutter  may be  debatable  but if
the statements  are  inaccurate,  this does not mean the  CWB was dumping  into the United
States market.  The CWB  initial payment  is a type of "down-payment"  and is not the  full
acquisition  price.  The  initial  price  is  established  each  year  by  the  CWB,  based  on
expected market prices over the course of the crop-year,  and the initial payment  is set low
enough to avoid  a deficit in the  pool.  Thus, the initial CWB price  is always set below the
expected average  price for  the year.  The  CWB's true  acquisition  price  is the  crop-year
average  price  paid  for  grain purchased  in the  pool and  thus  about one-half  of the  sales
during the year are typically below the acquisition  price.  The very nature of price pooling
is designed to smooth price fluctuations  over the crop-year  by returning the average  price.
All sales  cannot be made above the  average,  and thus  it may be impossible  for the CWB
to meet  the terms  of CUSTA's section  701.3,  strictly  interpreted.
Milling  Wheat
The  dispute  in  durum  then  spread  into  regular  milling  wheat  shortly  after  the
binational  panel  ruled  against  the  United  States  on  durum.  In  response  to  political
pressure  in the northern  wheat-growing  regions of the  United States,  President  Clinton
requested  the  International  Trade  Commission  (ITC)  investigate  the  effects  of wheat
imports  from  Canada  in  1994.  In  July  1994,  the  ITC  reported  with  a  split  decision.
Three  Commissioners  found  that imports  from Canada  had materially  affected  the  costs
of the  wheat  program  through  lowering  prices  and  increasing  the  value  of deficiency
payments,  thereby  potentially triggering the  use of import quotas  to protect the  program.
4 See the  Final  Report  of CUSTA's binational  panel  in the  matter of "The  Interpretation  of
and  Canada's  Compliance  With  Article  701.3  With  Respect  to Durum  Wheat  Sales"  CDA-92-1807-01,
February  8,  1993,  pp.  39-41.
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The other three  Commissioners  found these  imports  had not materially  affected  the cost
of the wheat program  but that they did have  some effects  on particular regions and classes
of wheat.  All  six supported  the  recommendation  that  higher  import  barriers  should  be
introduced.
However,  even  before  the  ITC  had reported,  in  April  of  1994  the United  States
government notified  the GATT under  Article XXVIII  that  it intended to  amend its  tariff
rates  on wheat and  barley  imports  from Canada (Simone,  1994).  It can be inferred  from
this preemptive  action that the United  States  was not seeking  temporary  protection  from
perceived injury,  otherwise alternative  measures could have been used, such as Section  22
legislation.  It  may  be  concluded  that  in  the  absence  of a  negotiated  settlement  with
Canada, Article XXVIII  offered  the best alternative  for the United  States, despite  the risk
that Canada would use  the provisions  of the  Article to  seek compensation  or to retaliate
(Carter  and  MacLaren,  1995).
In  August  1994  after  protracted  negotiations,  an  agreement  between  the  two
countries  was  reached.  There  are  three  elements  to  this  agreement  which  include:
schedules  of tariff rate  quotas  on  durum  and  non-durum  wheat  imports  by  the  United
States from  Canada;  the establishment  of a Joint Commission  to examine  each country's
price  support  systems  for  grains  and  their  effects  on  third  country  trade;  and  a  peace
clause  which  limits  for  one  year  actions  on  grains  and  grain  products  which  are  not
consistent with  either  the NAFTA  or the  GATT.  While the  United  States  withdrew  its
proposed actions under GATT's Article XXVIII,  Canada maintained  the right to challenge
United  States  actions  under both the NAFTA  and the  GATT,  although  agreeing  for one
year  from  September  1994  not  to  use  the  dispute  settlements  procedures  of  either
Agreement.
Why did Canada agree to this outcome which, at the export levels prevailing during
1993/94,  would lead to  a loss of export earnings?  Could Canada  have  forced the United
States to  use Article  XXVIII  of the GATT  and then,  legitimately,  have imposed its own
import restrictions  on, or  sought compensation  from, the  United  States?  As Canada had
maintained  that  GATT obligations  took precedence  over  obligations under the NAFTA,
it was infeasible  to claim as a negotiating ploy that the United States was violating Article
401  of the  CUSTA  by  raising  tariffs.  At the  same  time,  it  can hardly  be  claimed  that
Canada had entered  into the spirit  of the  Uruguay  Round Agreement  on Agriculture  with
respect to the tariffication process  of non-tariff barriers  for the supply managed  products;
these  out-of-quota  rates being established  at prohibitive  levels.
Carter  and  MacLaren  (1995)  evaluated  the  1994  wheat  trade Agreement  between
the  United  States  and  Canada  in  the  context  of a  potential  trade  war  that  could have
erupted  given  the  determination  of both  sides.  Using  a  CGE  (Computable  General
Equilibrium)  model,  we  concluded  that  the  1994  Agreement  appears  to  have  been  a
success,  from  the viewpoint  of the  Canadian  government  and  its desire  for an outcome
that  minimized  losses  in the  face  of United  States  threats  to  impose  permanent  import
barriers  on Canadian  grains.  Even  though the Agreement resulted  in economic  costs  for
both  countries,  it  was  successful  in  the  sense  that  it  averted  a  potentially  damaging
agricultural  trade war.
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Barley
The  dispute  in  barley  has  not  reached  either  the USITC  or the  binational  panel,
because  the  CWB  has  not  aggressively  marketed  barley  in the  United  States,  partly  for
fear  of retaliation  on the part of the United  States (Brooks,  1993).  However,  within the
Canadian  public  policy  arena,  the  barley  debate  has  been  vigorous  (Veeman,  1993;
Johnson  and Wilson,  1993).  The CWB (1992)  has argued that in the case of barley  it has
market power  in the United  States, and thus  it is optimal  to restrict sales into that market.
Accordingly,  the  CWB has  argued the United  States barley  market is not highly important
for  Canadian  farmers.  This  claim has been  challenged  by  Carter (Carter,  1994), and  by
Johnson  and  Wilson (Johnson  and Wilson,  1994),  who  find no evidence  of CWB  market
power  and,  instead,  argue  there  is  good  potential  for  additional  feed  and malting  barley
sales from Canada to the United  States.  The feed grain demand  would be in the western
part  of the  United  States,  the  Pacific North  West (PNW)  (including  Oregon,  Idaho,  and
Washington)  and  California.
Farm  groups  in Canada are  split over this issue of whether  or not to aggressively
pursue the  United  States barley  market, as  is the Canadian  grain handling  and processing
industry.  For  instance,  the brewing  industry  in Canada would prefer free  trade  in North
American  malting barley  and  malt, whereas  the  Canadian maltsters  prefer  the status  quo
whereby the  CWB controls  sales.  It might seem paradoxical  that the Canadian maltsters
prefer  to  buy  from  a  monopoly  but they  are  obviously  willing to trade-off  any  cost  of
doing so against returns through other disguised forms of beneficial  government regulation
and  beneficial  treatment  by  the  CWB  with regard to  availability  and  pricing  of malting
barley  processed  for export.
Historically,  the  Canadian  and United  States barley  markets  were  essentially  two
separate  markets  until  the  CUSTA  agreement.  There  was  relatively  little  north-south
trade,  and price differentials across the border  frequently exceeded  transport and handling
costs.  There were two primary reasons for this market separation.  First,  the Canadian rail
freight  subsidy encouraged  east-west  movement  of grain within Canada,  and second,  the
CWB controlled  export permits  for barley  and  limited  export to  the United  States.
It has  been argued  earlier by the  author (Carter,  1993a;  1993b;  1994)  that a single
desk  seller  is  unwarranted  in  the  case  of  Canadian  barley  sales  to  the  United  States
because Canada is a price taker in the United States market.  The  inefficiencies  associated
with having a  government  single desk  seller  in  barley  far  outweigh  the  relatively  small
benefit from  domestic  price discrimination  in malting barley  within  Canada.
Alternatively,  Brooks  (1993)  claims  the  CWB  has  market  power  in  the  United
States  market  and  that  single  desk  selling  is  important  from  an  economic  efficiency
standpoint,  because he  reasons the system is most efficient when Canadian farmers  do not
know the United  States price of barley.  He argues that inefficient  resource allocation will
take place if prairie  farmers  are  in a position to compare  the spot United States price with
the  CWB pooled  price.  Theory would predict  that  inefficiencies  arising  from  a lack  of
market  signals under the  status quo adversely affect  the allocation of resources  in Canada
and distorts  the amount  of feed  and  malting  barley  produced.
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On  August  1,  1993  the  Canadian  government  implemented  a  continental  barley
market by  removing the CWB's control  over exports  to the  United  States.  However,  on
September  10th,  1993,  a  federal  court judge ruled  the government  decision  to  introduce
a continental  barley  market  was  illegal.  Thus  the  continental  market  was only  effective
for  forty  days,  but during this relatively  short time period  it was  estimated that  between
0.5  and  1.0  mmt  of barley  was  sold  to  the  United  States  (Johnson  and Wilson,  1994).
Prior to the 40-day record  level of exports,  the most the CWB ever previously sold in one
entire  year  was  0.47  mmt.  and  Johnson  and  Wilson  have  estimated  that  a  continental
barley market could result in Canadian exports  to the United  States reaching  3.5  mmt per
year.  This  reinforces  the  point  that reform  of the  CWB's  control  over  exports  would
most  likely lead  to  a higher  level of Canadian  sales into  the  United  States  market.  The
future  role  of the CWB  in the  barley  market  remains  an  unsettled  issue  in  Canada.
ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  VERSUS  POLICY REALITY
In  describing  the  role  of  economists  in  influencing  policy,  Paul  Krugman
(Krugman,  1994) divided economists  into two groups: policy entrepreneurs  andprofessors.
The  former  describes  economists  who  play  up  to  the  preconceptions  of politicians  and
special  interest  groups,  while  the  latter  describes  academic  economists  who  stick  to
academic arguments.  Krugman's rule  is that  if you see  an economic  expert  on television
quite  often,  then  he  or  she  probably  is  not  much  of  an  expert,  but  rather,  a policy
entrepreneur.  Robert  Nelson  (Nelson,  1987)  would  describe  Krugman's  group  of
professors  as neutral experts.
Many  economists  have  an  idealized  view  of their  role  in  policy making  and  are
often puzzled  as to why  their ideas are  typically  crowded out by  political considerations.
Economists  are constantly  frustrated  with policy  makers  who do  not place much weight
on  economic  efficiency.  Rivlin  has  explained  that  there  exists  a  large  rhetorical  gap
between  economists  and  policy  makers  and  largely  for  this  reason,  economists  have
limited  influence over policy.  Economists  do not speak the  same language  as politicians.
There  is  good reason to believe these  generalizations by Rivlin  apply in the case of North
American  grains  policy.  In describing  why politicians  and economists  rarely understand
one  another,  Alice  Rivlin  noted  that  "economists  and  political  leaders  not  only
miscommunicate,  but each  accuses  the  other  of incompetence,  obfuscation,  self-serving
motives,  and  anti-social  behavior"  (Rivlin,  1987, p.l).
However,  it is also possible that even if economists  are ineffective  in the short run,
their  ideas  may  slowly  percolate  into  the  future  shaping  of policies.  John  Maynard
Keynes argued  that the professors do have  an influence:
The ideas of economists and  political  philosophers, both when they are right
and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood.
Indeed  the  world is  ruled  by  little  else.  Practical men,  who  believe
themselves  to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences,  are usually
the slave of some defunct economist.  Madmen in authority, who hear  voices
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in the air, are distilling their  frenzy from some academic scribbler of afew
years  back.  I  am  sure  that the power  of the  vested  interests is  vastly
exaggerated compared with  the gradual encroachment of ideas (Keynes,
1936,  pp. 383-384).
Economists  have  been  partly  involved  in  these  recent  grain  disputes  but to  what
extent have  they had any  influence  over the  policy process?  Most policy  makers  would
probably  say that economists have had very  little influence.  Is the problem  due to the fact
that  economists  and policy makers  do  not  understand  one  another,  as  Rivlin  suggests?
Economists  working  as advocates  for special interest  groups have perhaps  played a larger
role  than that of the so-called neutral economists.  Academic  economists have  a tendency
to  implicitly support established  agricultural  policies by  remaining silent on the  issue and
not challenging  the  social  desirability  of policies.  Challenges  on  economic  efficiency
grounds  run  the  risk  of  offending  funding  agencies  (such  as  the  ERS  or  Agriculture
Canada)  or  other  politically  powerful  institutions  (such  as  grower  organizations,  the
Canadian  Wheat  Board  or private  grain  companies).  Agricultural  economists  are  often
careful  not  to  condemn  established  policies  for  fear  of  getting  involved  in  a  political
debate,  as  there  is a  fine  line between  economic  policy  analysis and  politics.
It  is  unavoidable  that  any  comprehensive  economic  analysis  of policy  issues  in
grains  involves  an investigation  of the  role of established  institutions.  Several  years  ago,
Hendrik  Houthakker  observed  that  "the  economic  analysis  of institutions  is  not  highly
regarded or widely practiced among contemporary economists"  (Houthakker,  1959, p.133).
Houthakker's  observation  remains  valid  today  in  North  American  grains  policy  and  it
partially  explains  why economists  have  been  less than effective.
Alternatively,  some of the  in-house economists working  for institutions such  as the
CWB,  or the United States Department  of Agriculture's Economic  Research  Service often
have  to take partisan  positions and stand  clearly on one side of the  line between  academic
policy analysis and politics.  These institutions  have a certain demand  for economists who
are willing to argue  a partisan position,  much  like  a lawyer  who tries  to get the  most  for
his  or  her  client.  This  is  not  to  say  these  institutions  do  not  employ  both  types  of
economists,  including  those who  are  expected  to be neutral analysts  and  provide  policy
advice based  on  economic  criteria  alone.
The  economic  arguments  put forth  during the  1994 USITC  hearings  on Canadian
wheat  imports  brought  out  both  the  policy  entrepreneurs and  the  professors.  The
arguments made during the hearings are summarized by Alston, Gray and Sumner (Alston,
et  al,  1994).  Three  groups  of economists presented  results  to the  hearings,  representing
the United  States Department  of Agriculture,  the  CWB, and the  USITC staff economists.
The  USDA  testimony  (Collins,  1994)  argued  that  Canadian  imports  of  wheat  had  a
significant impact on the United States wheat program  because the imports lowered United
States domestic prices  by  about 9cg  per bushel.  An  import quota  on Canadian  imports set
at  22.4  percent of  1993/94  imports  would  have  "saved"  the  United  States  government
about $230 million,  according  to the USDA economists.  Alston, Gray  and Sumner  found
a much  smaller  impact on the cost of the United States wheat program  and they estimated
program  costs  would only  fall by  about  $16  million if Canadian  imports  were  limited to
22.4 percent  of the  1993/94  level.  There  is  a tremendous  gap between  the  two  sets  of
estimates.  The USITC  commissioners  were  not impressed  with the intellectual  depth  of
141Proceedings
the  USDA  testimony  and  suggested  the  USDA  analysis  was  "essentially  political
statements,  devoid  of any  analysis"  and  this opinion  was  widely  circulated  in the press.
Ironically, after the USITC hearings,  another USDA economist (Haley,  1995) contradicted
the USDA  analysis  that was  prepared  for  the USITC  hearings.  Haley  concludes  that an
import  quota on  Canadian  wheat  imports  would  increase  the  cost  of the  United  States
wheat program,  rather  than lower it,  as argued  by Collins.  The  Haley result is confusing
however,  as  he  essentially  argues that an import quota will lower domestic  prices,  which
is at odds  with economic theory.  Elsewhere  in the Haley paper there  are serious  gaps  in
the depth of understanding  of the Canadian grain marketing system,  which suggests there
are  also significant  rhetorical  gaps amongst  economists.  For example,  he writes that "the
CWB  goal  is  to price  the  grain  sufficiently  low so  that  proceeds  from  CWB  sales will
cover  the  sum  of the  initial payments  to  producers"  (Haley,  1995,  p.4).  Haley  also
assumes  the  CWB  would  respond  to  a  United  States  import  quota  by  using  "export
subsidies  more  aggressively"  (Haley,  1995,  p.10).  What  export  subsidies?
Rivlin has  noted that  "economists tend to be uncomfortable  in the role of partisans
or  advocates,  preferring  to  be  seen  as  neutral  experts  whether  we  are  or  not"  (Rivlin,
1987,  p. 10).  Her  observation  suggests  that policy entrepreneurs might  ideally prefer  to
be seen as neutral experts but sometimes the policy entrepreneurs  have trouble hiding their
stripes.  This  is an alternative  way of saying  that even  though economists  portray  others
as rent-seekers,  they do  not want  to see  themselves  as rent seekers (Cordes  et al.,  1993).
CONCLUSION
It appears  as  though the  making  of grains  policy  in Canada and  the  United  States
is  ninety percent politics and ten percent economics,  and this might be an optimistic  view
of the role  of economics.  Policy  makers and  economists  do  not seem to understand one
another and  this may  explain  why economists  do  not appear  to be very effective  when  it
comes  to  influencing policy makers.  For  instance,  economists  are  constantly  puzzled as
to why  the  United  States  government  wastes  so  much  money  subsidizing  grain  exports
under the export enhancement program,  or why the Canadian government believes farmers
are better off not knowing the  true price of their grain.  Policy makers often  have simple
answers  as  to why  these  policies  are  popular,  and  the  answers  have  nothing to  do  with
economics.  However,  maybe  all is not lost, as Keynes has argued that economist's  ideas,
whether  they  are  good  or bad  ideas,  gradually  have  an  important  influence  on  policy.
Perhaps  Keynes was not referring  to grains policy,  or even agricultural policy,  or perhaps
economists  are  just  too  impatient  with  the  policy  process  and  Keynes  was  right  that
economists  are  more  influential  than is  commonly  believed.  It just takes  time  for their
ideas to  sink  in.
Economists  involved  in  the  grains  policy  process  have  operated  as  both policy
entrepreneurs and neutral experts.  However,  neutral experts have  a tendency  to  avoid
criticizing  important  institutions and  established policies, partly because  these institutions
tend  to  be  important  funding  agencies.  The  quote  by  Devons  at the  beginning  of the
paper  highlights  the  fact  that  it  is  often  difficult  for  even  so-called  neutral experts to
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separate  out the economic  versus political  aspects  of the  problem.  Thus,  there may be a
tendency  on behalf of the neutral experts to  avoid working  on issues  that are potentially
politically  charged,  such as North American  grains  policy.  They are not only  neutral, but
smart  enough  to  avoid researching  issues that could  become politically  contentious.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alston, J.M.,  R. Gray,  and D.A.  Sumner.  "The  Wheat War  of 1994"  Canadian  Journal
of Agricultural  Economics. 42  (1994):231-51.
Alston,  J.M.,  C.A.  Carter  , R.  Gray,  and  D.A.  Sumner.  "Domestic  Distortions  and  the
Gains From  Trade Liberalization:  The Case of Canada-U.S.  Durum Wheat Trade"
paper  presented  at  annual  AAEA  meetings,  San Diego,  August,  1994.
Brooks,  H.  "First,  Let's Assume  We have  a Can Opener:  An  Analysis of the Economics
of  a  Single  North American  Barley  Market"  Canadian Journal of Agricultural
Economics 41  (November  1993):271-281.
Carter,  C.A.  An Economic Analysis of a Single North  American Barley Market.  Report
prepared  for  the  Associate  Deputy  Minister,  Grains  and  Oilseeds  Branch,
Agriculture  Canada.  Ottawa:  March.  1993a.
Carter,  C.A.  "The  Economics  of a  Single  North American  Barley Market".  Canadian
Journal of Agricultural Economics 41  (November  1993b):243-255.
Carter,  C.  "The  Economics  of a  Single  North  American  Barley  Market:  A  Reply"
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics.  42  (1994):413-19.
Carter,  C. and  D.  MacLaren.  "Trade  Wars  and  CGE Modelling:  Wheat Trade  Between
Canada  and the United  States"  invited paper presented  at annual  conference  of the
Australian  Agricultural  Economics  Society,  Perth,  Australia,  February  1995.
Canadian  Wheat  Board.  Performance of a Single Desk Marketing Organization in  the
North American Barley Market. Winnipeg:  December.  1992.
Collins, K. "Statement Before the U.S. International  Trade Commission"  Investigation No.
22-54  (Wheat,  Wheat  Flour,  and  Semolina)  April  28,  1994.
Cordes, J.J.,  A.  Klamer,  and T.C.  Leonard.  "Academic Rhetoric in the Policy Arena: The
Case  of  Capital  Gains  Taxation""  Eastern Economic Journal, Vol.  19,  No  4.
(1993):  459-479.
Devons,  E.  Essays in Economics: London:  Allen and  Unwin.  1961.
143144  Proceedings
Esty,  D.C.  "GATTing  the  Greens:  Not Just Greening  the GATT"  Foreign Affairs.  Vol.
72.  No.5,  November-December  1993:32-36.
Galbraith,  J.  "The  Grammar  of Political Economy"  in  The Consequences  of Economic
Rhetoric,  edited  by  A.  Klamer,  D.  McCloskey,  and  R.  Solow,  New  York:
Cambridge  University  Press.  1988.
Gray,  R.,  A.  Ulrich,  and  A.  Schmitz.  "A  Continental  Barley  Market:  Where  Are  the
Gains?"  Canadian Journal of Agricultural  Economics 41  (November  1993):271-
281.
Hafemeister,  J.  "Market Development  and China's GATT Membership"  paper presented
at  WRCC-101  workshop,  Reno, Nevada, November  21,  1994.
Haley,  S.L.  "U.S. Imports  of Canadian  Wheat: Estimating  the Effect  of the U.S.  Export
Enhancement  Program"  paper  presented  at  NAEFA/AAEA  winter  meetings,
Washington,  D.C.,  January  6-8,  1995.
Houthakker,  H.S.  "The  Scope  and  Limits  of Futures  Trading,"  in  The  Allocation  of
Economic  Resources:  Essays in Honor of Bernard  Haley, Moses Abramovitz  et al.
(eds).  Stanford,  California:  Food Research  Institute  (1959).
Johnson,  D.D.  and  W.W.  Wilson.  "Border Disputes  in  North  American  Barley  Trade:
Impacts  of Major  Agricultural  Policies".  Journal of Agricultural and Resource
Economics (forthcoming  1995).
Keynes,  J.M.  The  General Theory  of Employment,  Interest,  and Money.  New  York:
Harcourt  Brace Jovanovich,  [1936]  1953.
Krugman,  P.  Peddling Prosperity.  Economic  Sense  and Nonsense  in  the  Age  of
Diminished Expectations.  New York:  W.W. Norton  & Co.  1994.
Lermer,  G.  and  K.K. Klein.  Canadian Agricultural Trade. Disputes Actions Prospects.
Calgary:  University  of Calgary  Press:  1990.
Nelson,  R.  "The Economics  Profession  and the Making of Economic  Policy". Journal  of
Economic Literature. March  1987:49-91.
Rivlin,  A.  "Economics  and the  Political  Process".  American Economic Review.  March
1987:1-10.
Simone,  M.  "U.S.  and Canada:  The Nature  of Ag Trade  Disputes"  U.S.  Department  of
Agriculture.  Agricultural Outlook.  August  1994:28-31.
United States International  Trade Commission.  Durum Wheat.' Conditions of  Competition
Between  the  U.S. and Canadian  Industries.  Publication  2274.  Washington,  D.C.:
USITC.  June  1990.Carter  145
United  States  International  Trade  Commission.  Transcript  of Proceedings  Before  the
USITC, Investigation No. 22-54  (Wheat, Wheat Flour and  Semolina).  Washington
D.C.:  Capitol  Hill  Reporting,  April  1994.
Veeman,  M.  "A  Comment  on  the  Continental  Barley  Market  Debate".  Canadian
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 41  (November  1993):283-287.